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Abstract
Illicit drug trafficking is a prominent national security issue in a
globalizing world. Drug trafficking intersects with major security issues
such as rogue and narco-states, weak and failing states, insurgencies and
terrorism, transnational organized crime and protracted intrastate
conflicts. These are the same issues that sets the operational
environment for the deployment of SOF. Rather than treating drug
trafficking as a singular and separate security issue, global SOF
counternarcotics operations must adapt previous approaches to new
realities.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss2/4
21 
 
Introduction 
Illicit drug trafficking is a multi-billion dollar industry.  The United Nations and 
the International Monetary Fund estimate that illegal drug trade derives $600 
billion in annual profit, or the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of New Zealand, 
Ireland and Portugal combined.  As such, it accounts for 7.5 percent of global 
trade.  If it were a country, this would make it eligible for membership in the G-
20.  However, rather than a source of international stability or global prosperity, 
the trafficking of illicit narcotics undermines the national security of many 
countries and distorts the development of many societies.   
 
Early attempts to tackle illicit drug trafficking as a national security threat to the 
U.S. were focused on preventing drugs from reaching the homeland.  In 1988, the 
U.S.  Department of Defense was authorized to assist in stemming the tide of 
drugs entering the country.  In response, Special Operations Forces (SOF) were 
dispatched to assist a number of countries to enact a counter-supply strategy.  As 
part of this strategy, SOF have worked with host nations’ militaries and law 
enforcement agencies to interdict, detect and monitor drug cultivation, 
importation of precursor chemicals and transportation of the finished product. 
 
Such SOF operations fit into the current counternarcotics efforts as outlined in 
the DOD’s 2011 Counternarcotics and Global Threat Strategy.  These activities 
include measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity 
reasonably related to drug trafficking.  This includes, but is not limited to, 
measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail activities related to 
substances, material, weapons, or resources used to finance, support, secure, 
cultivate, process, and/or transport illegal drugs.1 
 
Although SOF have derived important institutional competencies from their 
counternarcotics efforts, drug trafficking can no longer be isolated from other 
national security threats or viewed as collateral to other international security 
issues.  Due to the unique nature of the trade, illegal drug trafficking networks 
have made threats to international and national security more complex, durable 
and acute.  Drug trafficking intersects with major security issues such as rogue 
and narco-states, weak and failing states, insurgencies and terrorism, 
transnational organized crime and protracted intrastate conflicts; the same issues 
that SOF are often called upon to participate in tackling.  Drug trafficking has 
transformed the security landscape by permeating nearly every aspect of it; 
meaning that SOF counternarcotics operations must adapt previous approaches 
to new realities and pursue a global, synchronized approach to combat illicit 
narcotics networks. 
 
Adapting Global SOF to the Drug-Security Nexus 
A vast array of actors who present threats to U.S. national security find illegal 
drug trafficking an especially seductive business to enter for a variety reasons.  
First, the profit from drug sales can be used to pay for arms, equipment, training, 
or turned towards bribing governmental officials and recruiting of sympathizers.  
Second, illegal narcotics also possess qualities that set them apart from other 
                                                        
1 U.S.  Department of Defense, Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
OSD, 2011): 4. 
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illicit commodities.  Unlike the illicit trade in diamonds, copper, and oil, drugs 
are a renewable resource that can be regularly harvested, given the proper 
conditions.  In short, they are a reliable means of generating high degree of profit.  
Third, illegal narcotics are also more appealing because of the ease of 
manufacturing, transportation and concealment, allowing for greater distribution 
and larger profit gain.  Most drugs are low weight, high value commodities, 
making it relatively easy to move profitable volumes.  The trade in oil, alluvial 
gems, and timber require the use of skilled labor and sophisticated technology 
whereas the trafficking in drugs requires low skill labor and limited technology.  
Fourth, drugs have an additional benefit that other commodities do not—they can 
be readily consumed by combatants to stimulate wartime nerve.  Finally, drugs 
can be a means to attack an adversary’s military and society in the belief that this 
will lead to battlefield or ideological victory.  Encouraging drug use within the 
enemy’s military or the enemy’s society provides a group with one more weapon 
against its enemy.  As a result of these characteristics, drugs are the most fungible 
commodity within some of the most challenging security dynamics of today. 
 
A global SOF network can be particularly valuable in tackling the expansive 
challenges of the international drug trade.  SOF personnel are accustomed to 
operating in complex political, social and economic environments where the 
drug-security nexus exists.  Admiral McRaven articulated U.S.  Special Operation 
Command’s (USSOCOM) awareness of the complex interdependence of today’s 
national security issues: 
 
“We live in a world in which the threats have become increasingly 
networked and pose complex and dynamic risks to U.S. interests around 
the world.  These networks are diversifying their activities, resulting in the 
convergence of threats that were once linear.  In today’s environment, this 
convergence can have explosive and destabilizing effects—there is no such 
thing as a local problem.”2 
 
As a tool of U.S.  security policy, a global SOF network will be used in conjunction 
with other facets of the DOD as well as with other government departments and 
agencies to further key strategic aims of the United States.  These strategic aims 
include creating a stable and secure international environment for the pursuit of 
American interests through a network of regional partners.3 
 
However, due to the deep enmeshing of drug trafficking into the fabric of other 
unconventional threats, a global SOF network cannot treat counternarcotics as 
separate and distinct from other operations deemed to be more tethered to 
broader national security aims.  This is revealed in the DOD’s 2011 
Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy mission statement, which 
recognizes the perniciousness of drug trafficking: 
 
“The Department of Defense, as the single lead agency for detection and 
monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illicit drugs into the United 
States and an important contributor to national efforts to counter 
                                                        
2 Admiral William McRaven, Posture Statement before 113th Congress, House Armed Services 
Committee, U.S.  House of Representatives, March 6, 2013, 2. 
3 Szayna, Thomas and William Welser IV, Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF 
Network (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013): 1. 
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transnational organized crime, conducts operations and activities to 
disrupt and degrade the national security threats posed by drug 
trafficking, piracy, transnational organized crime, and threat finance 
networks reasonably related to illicit drug trafficking activities.” 
(emphasis mine)4 
 
Because drug trafficking does not stand apart from other security issues, 
counternarcotics operations will become nested in a number of issues which SOF 
currently or potentially have a role in addressing.  Rogue and narco-states, weak 
and failing states, insurgencies and terrorism, transnational criminal 
organizations and protracted intrastate conflicts each reveal the drug-security 
nexus where SOF are, or potentially may be, called on to operate. 
 
Rogue and Narco-States  
A number of national governments have active links to illegal drug trafficking.  
North Korea, Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau and Syria each have been implicated in 
distributing illegal narcotics to enrich the ruling elite.  Bureau 39 of the North 
Korean government is dedicated to perpetrating criminal schemes, like drug 
manufacturing, smuggling and distribution.5  Members of the Afghan 
government continue to be enriched by the opium trade, bolstering Taliban 
claims that the national leaders are corrupt and do not care for ordinary citizens.6  
Guinea-Bissau has become Africa’s first narco-state; former President João 
Bernardo Vieira was assassinated in March 2009; meanwhile the country’s 
leading military officers have been designated “drug kingpins” by the U.S. 
Government.7  The ongoing Syrian civil war has been the scene of widespread 
drug manufacturing and consumption by pro-Assad forces, extremist militias and 
other rebel groups.  A Reuters news agency investigation, for example, revealed 
that “Syria has seen a huge rise in the use and manufacture of amphetamines as 
fighters on either side of its civil war use the drugs for staying power in battle.”8 
 
In the cases of North Korea, Guinea-Bissau and Syria, drugs help keep afloat 
regimes that are inimical to U.S. interests and stated policy objectives.  In the 
case of Afghanistan, the post-2014 stability of the country is in a precarious 
position due to the pervasiveness of the opium economy.  SOF forces operating in 
proximity to these countries can assist in reinforcing allies and friendly nations 
by adding intelligence analysis and surveillance training to understand the 
patterns of the drug trade.  In support of national security objectives, SOF 
personnel can also disrupt the flow of trade in order to bring pressure to bear on 
these governments.  However, SOF personnel must also be aware of how drugs 
                                                        
4 Department of Defense, Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy, 11. 
5 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “A North Korean Corleone,” New York Times, March 3, 2012, available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/a-north-korean-
corleone.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
6 Dan Murphy, “Afghan Corruption, Opium and the Strange Case of Kam Air,” Christian Science 
Monitor, February 5, 2013, available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-
Watch/Backchannels/2013/0205/Afghan-corruption-opium-and-the-strange-case-of-Kam-Air. 
7 Davin O’Regan, “Narco-States: Africa’s Next Menace,” New York Times, March 12, 2012, available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/opinion/narco-states-africas-next-menace.html. 
8 Colin Freeman, “Syria's civil war being fought with fighters high on drugs,” The Daily Telegraph, 
January 12, 2014, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10567021/Syrias-civil-war-
being-fought-with-fighters-high-on-drugs.html. 
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may undermine attempts to build partner capacity.  Corruption and addiction can 
take hold of host nation militaries that lie along well-established trafficking 
routes.   
 
Weak and Failing States 
The presence of drug crop cultivation and narcotics trafficking add fuel to the 
forces of internal disorder that disrupts governmental authority.  Civil society 
suffers when disorder, criminality, and poverty become ingrained.  Cynicism 
towards government can lead to resentment, which can foster support for 
alternative power structures in society.  A vicious cycle ensues.  Such 
degeneration in governmental legitimacy can lead to the creation of swaths of 
ungoverned spaces, which provide rich environments for various armed groups to 
operate freely.  Diminishing governmental authority, and the consequent loss of 
power to protect citizens and provide modest economic security, promotes state 
weakness and failure.  In countries like Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras this dynamic has led to the current state where criminal gangs control 
segments of cities, outmatching and outgunning law enforcement. 
 
Legitimate agriculture also suffers in weak and failing states where drug are 
cultivated, thereby lowering prospects for sustainable economic development.  
Drug crops have a competitive advantage over legitimate crops.  Farmers can 
earn more from drug barons than they can by relying on the workings of a 
legitimate market.  In effect, drug barons can subsidize the production of crops at 
a higher rate than a government or international organization can with legitimate 
agriculture.  With the profitability of drug crops outstripping that of legitimate 
crops and with finite arable land in a country, many farmers are compelled to 
enter the drug trade in order to earn a reasonable living.  Peru and Colombia still 
struggle to bring the cocaine economy under control.  The lack of legitimate 
economic incentives hamstrings development projects that have the potential to 
put these countries on a better track to sustainable economic prosperity. 
 
A global SOF network can assist in weaving a counternarcotics approach within a 
counter-disorder strategy as a way to promote efforts aimed at generating state 
strength.  Taking advantage of the previous relationship with the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Afghanistan, SOF teams in conjunction 
with the DEA can assess areas where disrupting drug trafficking networks can 
reduce support to alternative power structures in a given society.  Additionally, 
key to building partner capacity is reducing the level of corruption in state 
institutions.  Identifying the ways that drug money infiltrates legal avenues would 
be beneficial to anti-corruption efforts initiated by agencies like the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and international organizations like the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  In short, a global SOF network 
will need to treat counternarcotics operations as a way to support other efforts 
that help legitimate actors gain political capital within societies of weak and 
failing states.   
 
Insurgencies and Terrorism 
Drug trafficking has been used to finance insurgent and terrorist groups, making 
them more resilient to attempts to disrupt, dismantle and defeat them.  Groups 
ranging from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in 
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Colombia to the Taliban in Afghanistan, from the Movement for Unity and Jihad 
in West Africa (MUJAO) in Mali to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 
Mauritania have benefitted from trading narcotics to purchase arms, pay for 
expertise, and attract recruits.  Additionally, members of jihadist groups from 
West Africa to the Hindu Kush have consumed a wide range of narcotics as a way 
to conduct violent operations like suicide bombings.  Jihadist suicide bombers 
are known to consume drugs as varied as heroin, meth, and Ritalin as a way to 
steady themselves before detonating their devices.9 
 
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review directs that  
 
“DOD will rebalance our counterterrorism efforts toward greater 
emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states, 
while retaining robust capability for direct action, including intelligence, 
persistent surveillance, precision strike, and Special Operations Forces.”10  
 
When permitted to work in a host nation to tackle insurgents or terrorists, SOF 
can draw on its experience from dealing with the drug-security nexus in 
Afghanistan.  U.S. law permits military support for law enforcement activities 
when the military proves a direct connection between counterterrorism efforts 
and counternarcotics operations.  One researcher notes: 
 
“Military lift and security support have been provided by special 
operations forces (SOF) to target high-value individuals where the nexus 
can be established.  In this case, there is no restriction to military support 
because it is considered a military mission rather than a law enforcement 
mission.”11  
 
Because the military can only directly target drug traffickers who have proven ties 
to insurgents or terrorists within a host nation, “proving these links can be 
difficult and time consuming, making it unfeasible for the military to engage in 
situations that require a quick response.”12  SOF can therefore be useful in 
supporting host nation forces with not only targeting high-value individuals, but 
with training host nation forces to understand the nexus and to incorporate this 
understanding into their strategies.   
 
Another way to strike at the drug-security nexus is to target the drug financing of 
insurgent groups and terrorist organizations, which also falls into an area of SOF 
responsibility.  SOF also contributes to counter threat finance (CTF) activities.  
DOD Directive 5205.14 states that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
                                                        
9 Iftikhar Fidous, “What Goes Into the Making of Suicide Bomber,” The Express Tribune, July 20, 
2010, available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/28976/what-goes-into-the-making-of-a-suicide-
bomber/.   
10 U.S.  Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, D.C.: OSD, 2014): 
vii, available at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. 
11 LCDR Jonathan Biehl, USN, “Counternarcotics Operations in Afghanistan: A Way to Success or a 
Meaningless Cause” (Master Thesis: U.S.  Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 
available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA512380. 
12 Curtis, Lisa, U.S.  Counternarcotics Policy: Essential to Fighting Terrorism in Afghanistan 
Backgrounder #2845 on International Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 
September 30, 2013), available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/us-
counternarcotics-policy-essential-to-fighting-terrorism-in-afghanistan. 
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Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (DASD SO/LIC), serves “as the principal 
civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on DOD CTF 
activities, capabilities, and employment of special operations forces, strategic 
forces, and conventional forces to engage in CTF activities.”13  Moreover, the 
Commander of USSOCOM, is the DOD CTF lead component for synchronizing 
DOD CTF activities.14 
 
Transnational Criminal Organizations 
Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO) and gangs challenge the 
government of Mexico while exporting their violence and drugs into the United 
States.  Because their logistics network for Andean cocaine runs over land, DTOs 
and gangs have also undermined stability in Central America.  Mexican DTOs 
and gangs have close associations with other Central American criminal groups 
and militaries; law enforcement is often outgunned and outmatched.  In Mexico 
alone, over 70,000 people have been killed in drug-fueled violence since 2006 
while homicide rates in countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador are 
far above the regional average. 
 
Where feasible, SOF can “support U.S. government efforts to improve the 
capacity of Mexico and other illicit drug transiting countries to secure their 
borders and enforce the rule of law within their territory.”15  U.S. SOF can partner 
with the special forces of host nations to ensure their professionalism through 
anti-corruption and ethics training.  Increasing professionalism can help reduce 
the collusion between host nation military members and drug traffickers.  
Intelligence and surveillance training can also assist in interdiction efforts, 
thereby striking at the profits of transnational criminal organizations.   
 
Protracted Intrastate Conflicts 
Because warfare can now be more easily sustained with drug funding, the 
expected length of conflicts is more than double that of conflicts that started prior 
to 1980.16  This can be attributed to the accessibility of drug resources and 
revenues that permit militarily weaker groups to maintain their viability rather 
than being swept from the battlefield.  Segments of the drug trafficking 
infrastructure are now part of the strategic equation for many combatants.  With 
drugs now playing the role of an economic engine for many belligerents, battles 
for control over aspects of drug trafficking has occurred.  As a result, drugs have 
often deepened conflicts.  Not only do drugs provide another means to continue 
fighting, but they also provide another reason as well.   
 
Many violent non-state groups have a vested interest in the ongoing unrest and 
disorder in their areas so they can secure transportation routes for drugs.  
Clashes over drug resources, resembling “turf wars,” routinely occur among the 
warring groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Myanmar.  These conflicts 
engender a vicious cycle where sustaining the conflict becomes necessary to 
secure access to parts of a trafficking network because the rise in violence 
                                                        
13 U.S.  Department of Defense, Directive 5205.14 (Washington, D.C.: OSD, August 14, 2010): 4. 
14 Ibid, 9. 
15 Department of Defense, Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy, 14. 
16 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffer and Mans Soderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War,” Policy Working 
Paper 2861, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001). 
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between groups becomes increasingly costly.  These phenomena are not only 
present in drug producing countries, but in transit countries as well.  For 
example, during the war in Bosnia the police chief of Sarajevo accused a tri-
ethnic mafia of prolonging the siege of the city to profit from the black market.17  
Weapons were traded for drugs and smuggled to both sides of the siege; “the 
result was to reinforce the siege—and thus prolongation of the war.”18  It takes 
considerable political will and equal resources for governments to deal with the 
actors engaged in drug trafficking who want conflicts to continue. 
 
SOF: A Global Force for a Global Problem 
In an effort to end a protracted conflict and contain or mitigate its effects in these 
region, SOF can be especially valuable.  SOF can work to monitor, detect and 
trace drug trafficking flows in order to disrupt the criminal activities of 
combatant groups; this can add pressure on these groups, making them more 
amenable to ceasefire or peace agreements.  In situations where nation building 
and stability operations are mandated, SOF can adopt a varied counternarcotics 
approach.  Hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies should be added to lists as 
objectives that need to be secured in an intervention.  These facilities are also 
now a war-making resource for combatant groups where they have been looted.  
Attaching as much importance to these facilities as weapons depots, ammo 
dumps, and campaign headquarters may lead to a decrease in the overall violence 
in the conflict.   
 
Additionally, reducing drug use among combatants can lead to the lowering of 
violence overall.  By lessening the consumption of drugs among belligerents, 
command and control can be strengthened among them, thus increasing the 
likelihood of adherence to the parameters of any possible peace accord.  Reducing 
drug use also limits the potential for further atrocities.  This can promote a 
virtuous cycle.  By focusing on reducing drug use, peace initiatives have a greater 
chance to flourish, thereby lessening the conditions of intense violence that led 
many fighters to take drugs.  SOF can assist with disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration programs by supporting the Medical Civil Action Program 
(MEDCAP) efforts that are focused on treating drug addicted former combatants.   
 
Conclusion 
The menace of drug trafficking will be an abiding source of insecurity and 
instability worldwide for the foreseeable future.  International security and the 
drug trade will be intertwined against a backdrop of fragmented sovereignty, 
overlapping allegiances, and untold numbers of influential actors.  As a result, the 
drug-security nexus will be more complex, involving more players, more sources, 
and more diversity than has been previously witnessed.19  Such a nexus 
challenges the DOD’s strategic priorities, listed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, to “protect the homeland; build security globally; and project power and 
win decisively.”20  
 
                                                        
17 Bourgarel, Xavier, Bosnie: Anatomie d’un Conflit (Paris: LaDecouverte, 1996), 126. 
18 Peter Andreas, “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia,” International 
Studies Quarterly (June 2004): 39. 
19 Booth, Martin, Opium: A History (New York: St.  Martin’s Griffin, 1996), 290-91. 
20 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, v. 
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Counternarcotics operations, therefore, cannot be done for counternarcotics sake 
alone.  Counternarcotics is a means, not an end.  SOF will play a key role in 
tackling the illegal trade and its role in bolstering threats to U.S. national security 
such as rogue and narco-states, weak and failing states, insurgencies and 
terrorism, transnational organized crime and protracted intrastate conflicts.  
Drug trafficking’s deep intersection with other international and national has 
made the illicit trade a truly global problem that requires a response that is 
equally vast.   
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